The Perspective of Inferring the Perception of Others

Over the past several years, I have been conducting research in the perspective of inferring the perception of others. Put simply, my research examines how people infer what others are thinking, and uses those inferences to analyze a range of social issues. Within academic disciplines, my research extends from studies of false consensus in social psychology. This concept is defined as "the tendency for individuals to regard their own judgments, opinions, and behaviors as relatively common and appropriate in a given situation, while viewing alternative responses as unusual, deviant, and inappropriate^[1]."

Whether we choose to engage in a particular action is influenced not only by how we personally think, but also by our perception of how others are likely to think. Even if we personally feel that something might be acceptable, it is easy to imagine a process in which we may hesitate if we infer that many others would probably view the same thing negatively.

Our decision-making is not influenced by the objective reality of what others actually think; rather, it is impacted by the subjective reality of how we infer the perceptions of others. However, these perceptions are often distorted or far removed from reality. It is easy to understand that acting on the basis of such distorted perceptions carries the risk of eliciting unexpected responses from the real world.

Of course, the others whose perceptions we try to infer may include people close to us, such as family and friends, as well as the general public. Accordingly, many different variations of research could be conducted. In this article, I would like to introduce a research example that approaches the topic through estimation of opinion distribution; that is, inferring how the majority of people tend to think.

Incidents involving Internet slander have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years. When the desire to attack someone conflicts with the awareness that one should not attack others, some form of discord arises. To overcome this discord, it seems likely that individuals rely on a logic that allows them to rationalize or justify their slander. In other words, they create an excuse.

If individuals anticipate that their slander will not be supported by many others, they are likely to hesitate before posting. Conversely, if they expect support from many others, this expectation may push them toward posting. With these two perspectives in mind, let us consider the issue from the standpoint of sympathy for such excuses^[2].

In a questionnaire administered to university students, I first presented the following premise: "Suppose that a person who posted slander about others online expressed the following five views." I then asked respondents how they themselves felt about each view. Examples of the views include "when someone behaves badly, they should be made to realize the gravity of their actions, even if that means criticizing them online" and "even if the comments are defamatory, complaining about online posts will only make society more restrictive." Participants were asked to choose from "I can sympathize," "I cannot sympathize," or "I cannot say either way" for each view.

I then asked a separate question: "Setting aside how you personally feel, what percentage of the following groups do you think would sympathize with this view?" For example, students were asked to fill in a specific percentage they infer in the blank: "Of your close friends, approximately ___% would sympathize." They were also asked to make similar estimates for other students currently in their classroom and for typical Internet users in Japan.

Although I will omit the details here, the results showed that, with the exception of one item, only a minority expressed sympathy; that respondents overestimated the proportion of other students currently in their classroom who would sympathize; and that individuals with a higher degree of sympathy tended to estimate a higher proportion of others who would share that sympathy.

The issue of proper etiquette among so-called railway photography enthusiasts has been frequently debated in recent years. In this context, I applied the same perspective as above, considering the matter from the standpoint of sympathy for such excuses^[3].

In a questionnaire survey administered to university students, I presented the following premise: "Suppose that a person who was reprimanded for not following proper photography etiquette expressed the following five views. For each statement, please mark the option you agree to and fill in the corresponding numbers." For example, one item reads: "It may indeed have been a breach of etiquette, but I had never been told anything before, and I'm sure that other people were taking photos in the same way. Why was I the only one who had to be reprimanded? I find being reprimanded a bit hard to accept." For each statement, participants were asked, "How do you feel about this yourself?" and responded with "I can sympathize," "I cannot sympathize," or "I cannot say either way."

I then asked a follow-up question: "Setting aside how you personally feel, what percentage of the following groups do you think would sympathize with this view?" Students were asked to fill in a specific percentage they infer in the blank, for example: "Of the students currently in this classroom, approximately ___% would sympathize." They were also asked to make similar estimates for those who enjoy photography and the general public in Japan.

Although I will omit the details here, the results showed that only a minority expressed sympathy; that respondents overestimated the proportion of other students currently in their classroom who would sympathize; and that individuals with a higher degree of sympathy tended to estimate a higher proportion of others who would share that sympathy.

The two studies have the following two points in common.

The first point is that there may not be as many people who sympathize with excuses as you think. If an overestimation exists, there is no guarantee that an excuse you made will be met with the level of sympathy or acceptance you expect.

The second point is that if you sympathize with an excuse, you may be overestimating the proportion of others who will also sympathize. In other words, being personally inclined to feel sympathy carries the risk of mistakenly assuming that many others will share that same sympathy.

Specifically, in addition to your perception of the world being distorted, your own cognitive tendencies may further amplify that distortion. To curb various forms of deviant behavior, it may be more effective to first help people understand this process of compounded misperception, instead of simply listing a set of prohibitions.

Of course, the primary goal should be the cultivation of intrinsic moral awareness and ethical sensibilities, along with improvements in educational methods to support this. However, if problems continue to recur and deterrent measures have reached a dead end, approaches of the kind suggested above may also prove to be effective.

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[Reference Literature]

[1] Oka, T., "False consensus effect," The Compact Dictionary of Social Psychology (edited by Kazutaka Furuhata), Yuhikaku Publishing, p. 209, 1994.
[2] Murata, M., "Sympathy for Excuses for Internet Slander," Communication, Information and Society, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 14 to 24, 2017.
[3] Murata, M., "Sympathy for Excuses for Violating Photography Etiquette," Communication, Information and Society, Vol. 20, Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 4 to 13, 2024.