2019年2月18日開催 公開研究会開催報告 （非線形経済理論研究会）

【要　旨】

This study investigates the social desirability of free entry into a co-opetitive mixed market where firms compete in a homogeneous product market while investing in property resources to boost demand.Our findings indicate the magnitude relationbetween the business stealing effect and the common property effect depends on the degree of privatization and the value of fixed cost, and that the magnitude is a critical factor determining whether the number of entrants under free entry is socially insufficient or excessive. Firstly, we consider a scenario where all the entrant and incumbent firms equally incur the same positive fixed cost. When there is a highly  nationalized semi-public firm  in the market, the number  of entrants is socially insufficient under free entry. Meanwhile, there is a highly privatized semi-public firm, the number of entrants will be socially excessive under free entry. Secondly, we show that free entry yields excess entry in cases of no fixed cost environment. Therefore, the degree of privatization and the value of fixed cost may serve as a guideline for entry regulation policy.