2018年7月26日開催 公開研究会開催報告 （人口・労働・社会保障研究会）

【要　旨】In contrast to the usual view that a decentralized redistribution program will lead to sub-optimal provisions, a new perspective emerges that emphasizes the positive effect of yardstick competition to offset the free-riding tendencies among neighboring jurisdictions. To test the new view, we estimate using panel data a spatial lag model of local government spending on a targeted health insurance membership program for the poor in the Philippines. To control for possible endogeneity bias and thereby establish causality, we take advantage of the variations in term limit status of mayors and apply both instrumental variable methods and two-way fixed effects (location and year). We find strong evidence that while local governments match the increase in the expenditures of their neighbors, they spend less on the margin when the incumbent mayor faces a term limit, other things held constant. Our placebo that other, non-contiguous neighbors in the same province have no similar influence. Overall, our results are consistent with the yardstick competition hypothesis.