2018年 7月24日(木) 公開研究会を開催しました。
【テーマ】Subsidies and Self-funding
【報告者】 新井 泰弘 氏 （高知大学人文社会科学部 専任講師）
【日 時】 2018年７月24日（火）16:40～18:10
【場 所】 中央大学多摩キャンパス 2号館4階 研究所会議室3
This studies presents how the combination of subsidies and (implicit or explicit)
commitment to self-funding affects R&D and its efficiency. We develop a simple
model where a funding body, who does not know the true cost of a project, requires
a credit-constrained recipient with private information to commit to a minimum
amount of self-funding for the project.
We demonstrate that such a commitment can help the funding body to direct
funds to recipients who genuinely require subsidies, and mitigates wasteful
diversion of funds. Self-funding commitment leads to “crowding-in”, where the
expected private R&D expenditure increases with the amount of subsidies, since
higher subsidies induce more high-cost projects to be undertaken whilst ensuring
at least some self-funding for any implemented project.
Meanwhile, requiring too much self-funding discourages socially desirable
projects due to the recipient’s own financing cost. We derive the optimal
subsidization policy, which depends crucially on the cost of funds for both the
funding body and the recipients, as well as the positive externalities of projects
and potential social loss from diversion.
We find that i) requiring self-funding commitment may be desirable only if the
funding body’s financing cost is lower than that of the recipient; and ii) self-
funding commitment is efficiency enhancing if the recipient’s cost of funding
and social loss from diversion are high, and the positive externalities from the
project are not too high.